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CHAPTER I 
LITICRA'l'UR! REVIEW 
The idea of diacrbninat:ion may be used as a tool to deal with the 
partial reinforcement effect (PRE) at both the objective and theoretical 
levels. At the objective level it may be used to describe the nature 
of the situation which will affect extinction phenomena. At the 
theoretical level it may be used as a mediating variable to explain 
why a given set of circumstances are followed by a given extinction 
phenomenon. 
The first use of the idea of discrimination to deal with the PRE 
is ordinarily credited to Mowrer and Jones (1945). They trained rats 
to bar-press on both continuous and discontinuous schedules, their 
results showing that the use of a discontinuous reinforcement schedule 
increased resistance to extinction. 'lbeee authors offered two explana-
tions for this. One was in terms of the response-unit hypothesis, 
defining a response as the total behavior leading to a reward and not 
as an isolated movement, or bar-press. The second explanation was in 
terma of discrimination, suggeating that the animal cannot discriminate 
as easily between acquisition and extinction if the rewards have been 
coming intermittently as when they are continuous. Thus they write of 
discrimination as a learned, eubjective (theoretical) response of the 
organism which is structured by a series of objectively described train-
ing situations. In thie case the theory adds nothing but explanation 
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to the system since it is little more than a name for a mediating 
variable which is inferred from the objective situation and data. 
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Bitterman, Feddersen, and Tyler (1953) used a behavioristic way of 
structuring the experiment without appealing to subjective phenomena. 
The experiment was structured entirely in terms of inputs and outputs. 
It was designed so there was a change in the stimulus input when 
extinction started allowing the organisms to discriminate and use the 
discrimination for purposes of adaptive behavior but the nature of the 
discrimination wae not considered at all. These experimenters divided 
their experimental animals into two groups. For Group I the interior 
of the goal box was the same color on all acquisition trials, while for 
Group II it was one color (black or white) on reinforced trials and the 
opposite color on nonreinforced trials. One-half the animals were 
extinguished with the goal box the same color on extinction trials as 
that reinforced on acquisition trials (Groups I-Sand II-S), and one-
half the animals were extinguished in a goal box of an opposite color 
to the goal box which had been reinforced during acquisition (I-N and 
II·N). 
The results in comparing mean log time during extinction between 
Group I-Sand Group I-N support the concept of secondary reinforcement, 
as Group I-S showed greater resistance to extinction than Group 1-N. 
However, the mean log time for Group II-N was significantly less than 
for Group II-S. The Group II animals which found a previously nonrein-
forced goal box showed significantly more re1istance to extinction than 
the rats which encountered the previously reinforced goal box. This 
cannot be explained by a concept of secondary reinforcement, but it is 
understandable by using the experimenters' hypothesis "that rate of 
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extinction is inversely related to the similarity between training and 
extinction" (p. 456). 
Since then the idea of discrimination bas been used in both objec• 
tive and theoretical ways, sometimes one use drifting into the other. 
Elam, Tyler, and Bitterman (1954) in a replication of the above experi• 
ment using rats reinforced during training in a goal box of one color 
and nonreinforced in a goal box of an opposite color obtained the same 
results as Bitterman, Pedderson, and Tyler (1953). They stated that 
the discrimination "may be based upon learning about !!2Ureinforcement 
and about stimuli associated with it," (p. 384) and that the n1earning 
influences the animal'• perception of the transition from training to 
extinction and hence (by the discrimination hypothesis) the stability 
of responae11 (p. 383). 
Mowrer (1960) discussed the discrimination hypothesis in objective 
terms, explaining it by saying that: 
It seems that the discrimination hypotheeis and the counter-
conditioning hypothesis are, in reality, one and the same, 
the only difference being that one is formulated in 'cogni-
tive' and the other in affective-dynamic terms (p. 477). 
Mowrer adds an affective dimension but otherwise maintains a behavior• 
istic outlook in commenting on the Bitterman, Fedderson, and Tyler 
(1953) experiment. He referred to the animals "'hoping' and responding" 
(p. 463) if they met extinction conditions like their training situation 
while the ones who met new conditions entering the extinction period 
"reacted to extinction as extinction, rather than aa continued acquisi• 
tion" (p. 464) • 
While Tolman (1932, 1951) did not use the term discrimination in 
discussing extinction, his research is pertinent since the idea behind 
nonresponse extinction is that a significant cue will enable the 
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organism to respond intelligently to the cues given him in the extinc· 
tion situation. Kendler (1971) reacts in much the saate way writing, 
"Cognitive control ••• suggests that the cause of a response is the 
manner in which the organism interprets available information" (p. 
962). 
Using male college students, Bridger and Mandel (1965) informed 
some of the subjects when extinction would begin (no further shock) and 
did not inform the other subjects. The informed subjects showed less 
resistance to extinction. The authors concluded that in a classical 
conditioning situation discrimination doea reduce resistance to extinc· 
tion, after stating in the introduction that: 
An adequate evaluation of the explanatory power of the dis· 
crimination hypothesis has hot been presented due to a 
failure to obtain a measure of !'s ability to discriminate 
between acquisition and extinction which is independent of 
the very response process to which the hypothesis is directed, 
i.e., resistance to extinction (p. 476). 
In a study of the generalized imitation effect, Steinman (1970) 
found that, although the subjects were discriminating between imitative 
responses which were reinforced versus nonreinforced, they continued to 
imitate the nonreinforced, as well as the reinforced, responses. 
Nonreinforced responses that were similar to reinforced responses were 
more likely to be imitated than di1similar responses. When the chil-
dren were told not to respond if they were not to be rewarded for doing 
so, much of the imitative behavior of nonreinforced respons~s ceased, 
but he gave no theoretical discussion of his results. 
Bandura and Barab (1971) in another study of the imitation effect 
flatly talk about di1crimination in a theoretical sense saying that 
cues acquire informative value. 
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Gladstone (1966b) used three treatment groups of college age 
subjects. All subjects were trained on the same fixed-interval and 
variable•ratio schedule. Past learning was not a part of the experi-
mental situation although it was assumed that all of the subjects bad 
past experiences which gave them the critical ability to discriminate. 
In one treatment group, the subjects could see the ten rewards in the 
reservoir, in the second treatment group the rewards were hidden from 
the subject, and in the third treatment twenty rewards were visible but 
only ten were emitted. The subjects in the first treatment group gave 
significantly fewer extinction responaea than those in the second, and 
those in the second treatment group gave significantly fewer responses 
than those in the third, who had v~sible, but unavailable, rewards. 
Gladstone concluded that, with bwnan beings, a better prediction of 
behavior is possible with cognitive, rather than Skinnerian, concept&. 
In hie next experiment Gladstone (1966&) used children, and the 
same apparatus without regard for secondary reinforcement effects. The 
equipment dispenses rewards on the same variable-ratio schedule for all 
groups. With the two and one-half to three and one-half age group there 
was no significant difference between extinction responses in a treat· 
ment in which the child could see that there were no more rewards in 
the equipment and a treatment in which the lack of further rewards was 
not visible. However, with children in the four and one•half to five 
and one•ha,lf year age group there were significantly fewer extinction 
responses. in the condition with apparent lack of further rewards than 
in the condition in which all rewards were hidden. Be concluded that 
the younger children performed bebavioristically while the older ones 
performed in a cognitive manner. As part of the same experiment 
Gladstone used college age subjects in three treatment conditions. He 
found that the mean number of responses in a condition in which the 
empty reward reservoir was visible was significantly less than in a 
condition in which all rewards, and lack of available rewards, were 
concealed from the subject. Subjects in another treatment group had 
concealed rewards; however, an irrelevant stimulus (light) appeared 
between the training and extinction periods. The comparison between 
this condition (in which the empty reward reservoir was obvious) and 
the alternative condition was not statistically significant, although 
the total number of responses was less in the condition in which the 
lack of further reinforcements was visible. 
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In a replication of Gladstone's (l966a) experiment, Gladstone and 
Miller (1968) pitted the condition in which the rewards were not visi-
ble and a light appeared when extinction started versus the condition 
in which the lack of further rewards was visible. They found that the 
responses were significantly less at the .01 level in the condition 
with obvious lack of further rewards than in the condition where the 
reward reservoir was not visible but a light came on. The authors con• 
cluded that a cognitive interpretation is "much more comfortable11 (p. 
38) than a behavioristic one. 
Conclusions 
The concept of discrimination has been shown to be a more useful 
tool for explaining, predicting, and controlling the partial reinforce-
ment effect than other concepts. However, no test has been conducted 
of the comparative power of the behavioristic versus the cognitive form 
of the concept. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Rationale 
This experiment is designed specifically to test the behavioristic 
and cognitive ways of reacting to discrimination as a way of dealing 
with the PRE. The behavioristic form is that extinction will occur 
more rapidly if there is a larger change between the learning and 
extinction situations. The cognitive form is that the significance of 
the change is the effective variable. 
Equipment 
The apparatus consisted of three lights controlled by a rheostat 
which could be used to control the brightness of the lights, a rat 
pellet feeder with ten BBs (instead of pellets), a cover on the pellet 
feeder which made the BBs invisible to the subject, a telegraph key by 
which the subject operated the equipment, a programmer which controlled 
the apparatus, and a counter which began counting extinction responses 
when the last reward fell. The feeder was set on a variable ratio 
schedule and the programmer could be set by! to turn on the scheduled 
light or lights at the beginning of the extinction period. Blankets 
were put over the windows to control the room for brightness. 
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Procedures 
Subjects 
The subjects were 72 college students drawn from Introductory 
Psychology classes. 
Subject-equipment Interaction 
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To test the subject-equipment interaction twenty students were 
asked to go through the training period but to stop when the light came 
on. Nine stopped at zero and 11 at onet indicating that some subjects 
were responding so rapidly that due to physiological response time or 
some other factor they were unable to stop at zero. 
Preliminary Experiment 
The extinction experiment itself called for two lights with the 
same brightness as one light and for three lights with the same bright-
ness as one light. These lights were controlled for brightness by the 
rheostat operated by!· To determine that the two dim lights appeared 
as subjectively bright as one light and that the three dim lights were 
as bright as one light, college sophomores shown the single light and 
the multiple lights were asked to "tell me when these lights are as 
bright as this light," after which the brightness of the multiple lights 
was varied. Means of the rheostat settings which were obtained were 
used as the settings for the dim lights. 
Conditions 
All subjects were trained on a variable-ratio schedule (Sil), and 
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in all the treabnent groups the reward reservoir was concealed. 
The aix extinction conditions of the six groups were: 
1. There was no difference between acquisition and extinction. 
2. One light came on and stayed on at the beginning of the 
extinction period. 
3. Two lights came on and stayed on at the beginning of the 
extinction period. 
4. Three lights came on and stayed on at the beginning of the 
extinction period. 
5. Two lights as subjectively bright as one light came on and 
stayed on at the beginning of the extinction period. 
6. Three lights as subjectively bright as one light came on and 
stayed on at the beginning of the extinction period. 
Each light in groups three and four was as bright as the light in 
group two, e.g., the two lights used in condition three used twice as 
much wattage as the one light used in condition two. 
Instructions 
The subjects were taken individually to the experimental room. 
The conditions were rotated so that the first subject was placed in the 
first condition, the next in the second, the seventh subject was as-
signed to the first treabnent group, etc. 
The experimenter gave the subject the following instructions: 
There are no tricks in thi1 experiment. Everything is 
just as it appears to be. We are trying to aee if some 
people act in a way which doesn't make any sense. We expect 
you to act sensibly. Just follow the instructions in a way 
which makes sense to you. 
Your task in this experiment will be to operate this 
machine. Here is how it works. Push down on this telegraph 
k,!Y and a small AB will drop into this cup, like this 
L ! demonstrate!,/, Later you will be given one cent for 
every BB you have. You will have one•tenth of a cent taken 
away for each tim~ you push the key. Do you understand what 
you are to do? L ! may repeat the essential instructions 
but questions as to the nature of the experiment will be 
answered pleasantly with the phrase ~I am not allowed to tell 
you any m!re about the experiment. Just act as sensibly as 
you can.':_/ You may start now. Please tell me when you are 
through . 
.! responds to .§.' s question, "Can I stop now?" with "It's up to 
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you. 11 When .§. says he is through ! will give the reward to .§. in exchange 
for the nwnber of BBs in the reward cup. If.§. obviously has stopped 
but does not say so, say "Are you through?" If! indicates he is, give 
him the reward. 
! asks.§. why he stopped responding and records .§.'s answer. Say, 
"Please do not discuss this experiment with anyone else." .! then 
records the nwnber of extinction responses showing on the counter. 
CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSICtiS 
Extinction was measured by the number of responses after the last 
reward fell. Non-parametric tests were used to find the significance 
of differences because the response measurers were ordinal but not 
normally distributed. 
The Mann-Whitney .Y. test and the K:ruskal-Wallis test were used to 
detect significance of the difference among the various treatments. 
The Mann•Whitney !! test is a good alternative to the S test, while the 
Kruskal-Wallis is used as an alternative to the! test (Siegel, 1956). 
The Mann-Whitney!! test was used to test the significance of the 
difference between the cue and no cue groups. A~ of -2.6593 was 
obtained which is significant at less than the • 01 level. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was used to test for possible significance 
of difference among the conditions using lights. An!! of 6.6120 was 
obtained, with a probability less than .20. 
The results of the statistical test between the light and no light 
treatments indicate that the difference introduced at the beginning of 
the extinction situation was used by the subjects·to discriminate, and 
the lack of significant differences among the five cue groups indicates 
that the amount of difference was not the significant factor. 
Since discrimination did take place and since it was not based on 
the amount of cue, the theory with which the experiment was structured, 
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that the subjects were discriminating in term• of the significance of 
the cue, is supported. 
12 
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APPENDIX 
lS 
Lights I 
Total rank per group I 
N I group I 
* 
TABLE I 
RANKS AND TOTAL RANK FOR EACH GROUP WHERE RANK IS CALCULATED 
WITHOUT REGA.RD FOR GROUP: SIX GROOPS 
0 1 2 3 
59.0 62.0 70.0 39.5 
71.0 30.5 9.0 9.0 
51.5 20.5 55.0 20.5 
60.0 30.5 44.0 64.5 
72.0 61.0 44.0 68.0 
25.0 14.5 30.5 25.0 
39.5 20.5 53.5 20.5 
30.5 58.0 69.0 25.0 
53.5 3.5 3.5 56.0 
35.5 47.0 44.0 3.5 
67.0 63.0 12.0 64.5 
49.5 47.0 39 .5 30.5 
614.0 458.0 474.0 426.5 
12 12 12 12 
Multiple lights subjectively estimated to give as much light as a single light. 
211* 3/i* 
39 .5 30.5 
30.5 51.5 
14.5 20.5 
14.5 39.5 
3.5 20.5 
9.0 39.5 
9.0 30.5 
66.0 14.5 
9.0 57.0 
3.5 17.0 
47.0 35.5 
3.5 49.5 
249.5 406.0 
12 12 
...... 
0\ 
TABLE II 
RANKS AND TOIAL RANK FOR EACH GROOP WHERE RANK IS CALCULATED 
WITHOUT REGARD FOR GROUP: FIVE GROUPS 
I * * Lights 1 2 3 2/1 3/1 
53.0 60.0 36.0 36.0 29.0 
29.0 9.0 9.0 29.0 46.0 
20.5 48.0 20.5 14.5 20.5 
29.0 40.0 55.5 14.5 36.0 
52.0 40.0 58.0 3.5 20.5 
14.5 29.0 24.5 9.0 36.0 
20.5 47 .o 20.5 9.0 29.0 
51.0 59.0 24.5 57.0 14.5 
3.5 3.5 49.0 9.0 50.0 
43.0 40.0 3.5 3.5 17.0 
54.0 12.0 55.5 43.0 33.0 
43.0 36.0 29 .o 3.5 45.0 
Total rank per group I 413.0 423.5 385.5 231.5 376.5 
N I group I 12 12 12 12 12 
* Multiple lights subjectively estimated to give as much light as a single light. 
.... 
...., 
TABLB III 
RAW DATA 
Lights I 0 1 2 3 211* 3/1* 
21 25 39 10 10 8 
44 8 2 2 8 15 
15 6 17 6 4 6 
22 8 12 31 4 10 
344** 24 12 37 0 6 
7 4 8 7 2 10 
10 6 16 6 2 8 
8 20 38 7 35 4 
16 0 0 18 2 19 
9 13 12 0 0 s 
36 26 3 31 13 9 
14 13 10 8 0 14 
I 
* Multiple lights subjectively interpreted to give as much light as a single light. 
**! stopped .§.. .... CD 
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